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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FRED R. LAW and
GERTRUDE R. LAW,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 9333

UINTA OIL REFINING
COMPANY, a corporation, and
UTAH COOPERATIVE
ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
FACTS
I propose the following corrections and additions to the factual narration of appellants:
1. Five or six days prior to the explosion appellants asked respondents if their tank "'could hold
a partial load of gasoline" and respondents answered
that it "could not at that time" ('Tr. 22) Respondents' tank did have some gasoline in it immediately
prior to commencement of unloading operations
(Tr. 42), and it was not measured on the occasion
1
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of the unloading (Tr. 76). This is additional evidence of appellants' negligence with respect to the
escape of the gasoline.
2. Appellants state that Burdick "instructed
Webb how to connect the hoses and unload the gasoline" (Brief 3). This implies that Burdick was in
charge of the unloading operations which is not
true. Actually what Burdick did was to show Webb
the location of the unloading devices and Webb
thereupon backed the trailer into position and made
the connections. Webb asked Burdick to open the
valve to respondents' stationary tank which Burdick did (Tr. 77). Burdick went back to his service
station duties (Tr. 78) and Webb proceeded with
his unloading operations.
3. In summ'arizing the testimony of the witnesses with respect to the physical layout of the
storage building appellants say "It was loosely put
together" (Brief 5). Even more significant insofar
as effect of the prevailing breeze in moving vapors
away from the interior of the storage house is the
fact that at the time 'and place in question the north
window (which was immediately north of the tank
and motor), the two small doors (one of which was
immediately west of the tank and motor), the one
large garage door and the stairway exit were all
wide open (Tr. 15, 16, 17, 21, 104).
4. The existence of the vent pipe extension
2
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which protruded through the roof and which served
the dual purpose of venting the tank and as a
conduit through which the gasoline in the tank was
measured was confirmed by the testimony of Mrs.
Law (Tr. 19, 20, 23, 41, 43); Burdick (Tr. 73, 74);
and by Gilson (Tr. 104, 105). The exact manner
in which this extension pipe was connected to the
vent stub is not in evidence.
5. Mr. Leavitt, as appellants report (Brief,
12), stated that the custom in the oil industry was
for the truck operator to remain in the immediate
area of the tank truck while it was dumping (Tr.
148) and he also stated on cross ex'amination that
the truck operator should "remain with the load
until it was dumped" (Tr. 150). It is not true as
appellants narrate (Brief, 12) that Leavitt said
"there was no custom with respect to what the operator of the service station does when deliveries are
made". On this subject Leavitt answered:
"No, sir we are, as far as the delivery
person, the recipient there is no obligation
for him to remain close to the delivery of the
gas." ('Tr. 149)
6. Olsen's testimony that prior to the explosion gasoline had flowed a 'distance of some 350
feet along the gutter near the highway as set forth
by appellants (Brief, 4) is confirmed by the testimony of Mrs. Law, Shaw and Burdick each of
whom testified to the wall or bank of fire in the
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

gutter which compelled them to run south in the
neighborhood of the bill board in order to cross on
to the highway (Tr. 29, 51, 64, 66, 73).
7. The jury in this case was presented conflicting testimony by two explosion experts, Dr.
Cook of the University of Utah and Dr. Bryner of
the Brigham Young University. The "five very significant facts" referred to by appellants (Brief,
9-10) are handled as follows by the experts:
( 1)

The place of the initial explosion:

Dr. Cook says it was in the region of the storage tank (Tr. 125-1'26). Dr. Bryner says the
explosion was both inside and outside the
storage building and ignition was almost instantaneous (Tr. 163, 166, 172, 17'3). Dr.
Bryner did not "reverse his direct testimony"
with respect to place of initial explosion as
appellants assert (Brief, 13). As support for
his conclusion that the explosion was both
within and without the storage building Dr.
Bryner called attention to the photographs in
evidence which showed the cement block wall
still inta-ct and he stated thrat had the explosion been only on the inside as contended by
Dr. Cook the cement block wall would have
been blown over (Tr. 163). Dr. Cook did not
explain this phenomenon.
Dr. Cook cites the inward bending of the
4
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storage tank as evidence that the explosion
occurred inside the storage building ( Tr.
129). Dr. Bryner replies that the inward
bending of the tank was the result of the
warping of metal incident to the application
of water to the heated metal tank (Tr. 162163).
(2) The vent pipe extension:
Dr. Cook concluded there was no such extension pipe connected because the female threads
on the vent stub were not sheared (Tr. 127128). Dr. Bryner countered with the observation that although these threads were not
sheared the vent pipe extension as described
by the witnesses was susceptible of connection
to the vent stub either (a) by standing a
larger size vent pipe over the stub or (b) by
putting a "metal cap around there and clamp
it on" (Tr. 168).
Dr. Cook found a metal flex pipe lying on
top of the storage tank with a connection size
which chanced to fit the vent stub and says,
"So I assume, of course, that this was intended
to be used in there as a vent pipe, but it was
just laying on top of the tank on my examination" (Tr. 128). This assumption was
erroneous. The extension pipe was a rigid
pipe. The flex pipe he found was used for unloading gasoline and was never intended or
5
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used as the vent pipe extension ( Tr. 52-53) .
( 3)

The bulging of the top of the stor-

age tank:

Dr. Cook says the top of the storage tank had
been bulged up and outward, indicating an
explosion had occurred inside the tank which
was less powerful than the explosion which occurred outside the tank (Tr. 128-129). This
we do not deny but Dr. Bryner made the more
helpful observation from the photograph Exhibit P-2 th~at the gasoline vapors burned jetlike out of the vent pipe for some time before
there was an explosion in the tank (Tr. 161162) and that it was a secondary explosion
which burst the tank (Tr. 162).
( 4)

The storage house electric motor:

Dr. Cook says this motor would emit sparks
(Tr. 129). Dr. Bryner says sparks would be
emitted only on starting, not while running,
and we submit that a fair construction of his
testimony (Tr. 169, 188) is to the effect that
the motor would not spark on being stopped.
Dr. Bryner further stated that "there's a possibility that a motor, moving machinery like
this, might ignite a fire, might ignite gasoline. Anybody would take that, even the best
induction motors could do it" (Tr. 183).
This court's attention is directed to Ex6
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hibit D-25, appeHants' enlarged photograph of
the motor, exhibited to the jury, which clearly
shows even the grill work on the motor to be
undamaged. That photograph is persuasive
evidence that the explosive spark wasn't emitted from that motor.
( 5) The discoloration on the interior of
the corrugated sheet metal forming the wall
next to the storage tank:
This, contends Dr. Cook, tends to prove the
ini ti'al explosion was inside the storage room
( Tr. 129). Not so, opines Dr. Bryner: A more
likely explanation is that that particular metal
was not blown away but stood an'd was burned
and discolored on the inside from the ensuing
fire (Tr. 164).

Let us place in juxtaposition some other
relevant testimony of the experts:
( 6) Whether expelled vapors resulting
from the filling of the tank likely would have
"pooled" near the motor?

Yes, says Dr. Cook, because there would
be "very little ventilation on that one side"
[north side of tank] (Tr. 130). He did not
discover evidence that there was an open
window on the north side (Tr. 132).
No, says Dr. Bryner, because there were
numerous openings in the storage house, all
enumerated in the hypothetical questions, in7
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eluding an open window and an open door
near the north side of the tank (Tr. 154)
which openings would permit the prevailing
wind to blow vapors away, and moreover
"the heat from the sun would tend to heat
the air all around underneath that 'and that
air would tend to move outward. Upward,
and then cold air would come in from the
bottom. The lo-wer areas ·and rise in that direction. Up toward the heat. The air probably from the North side or any place where
it could come in there would tend to go upward. From the heat. Radiation." (Tr.
159)
Dr. Cook on cross examination also admits "If standpipe was up, as I understand
you to state now, and there was a breeze, why
that would take, of course, the fumes away"
( Tr. 141). The photographs, observes Dr. Bryner, establish that there was a breeze (Tr.
159) and other witnesses testified as to existence of the standpipe (supra).
( 7) The physical fact of the presence of
the gasoline which escaped and ran in front
of storage house to the gutter and from thence
some 350 feet south-ward:
At the time he made his investigation
and arrived at his conclusion Dr. Cook did not
know that gasoline had escaped and that fact
does not appear to have been ·accepted by him
or considered by him at the time he testified.
8
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Dr. Bryner on the contrary did take into
account this "most significant" seventh fact
as established by the evidence in arriving at
his conclusions and stated on cross examination that the gasoline could have escaped by
reason of (a) a leaky fitting, (b) a poor connection on the pump or (c) an overflow of
the tank (Tr. 177, 179).
As to further confusion in and testimony
reversals on the part of Dr. Cook I call to the
Court his cross examination ('Tr. 134-141).
ARGUMENT
APPELLANTS' POINTS I AND II - DENIAL OF
APPELLANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO DIRECT VERDICT.

Points I and II enumerated by appeHants and
their argument in support thereof boil down to the
question of whether respondents established a prima
facie case of negligence so that the case was properly submitted to the jury. Specifically appellants
argue there were no evidentiary facts tending to
establish negligence on the part of appellants and
that it was left to the jury to speculate with respect
thereto.
This is not so. The following facts were clearly
established by the proof :
1. The truck driver Webb had the duty to re9
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main at all times within such proximity of the unloading operations that he could give immediate attention to any failure in the instrumentalities involved.
2. After the unlo'ading operations commenced
Webb did not remain with the truck but went to a
nearby cafe.
A large quantity of gasoline escaped. The
quantity of th_is gasoline was sufficient that it flooded across the sloping 'area in front of the storage
house, reached the highway gutter in front of th~
service station and flowed down this gutter approximately 350 feet. This gasoline so flowed before the
explosion. It was seen by Olsen who was passing
along -the highway immediately prior to the fire
(Tr. 83).
3.

The jury was entitled to conclude that Webb
was not present while this large quantity of gasoline was escaping because had he been there he
would have stopped the unloading operation or alerted the service station attendants for help, or would
have taken other safety measures such 'as application of water to wash away the dangerous gasoline (Tr. 85).
From the evidence adduced the jury was also
en ti tied to conclude that after Webb came from the
cafe he did close the top h'atch on his truck and
10
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shut off the fire valve; that all of the gas was unloaded by use of the electric motor and pumping
facilities and that the explosion occured thereafter.
See testimony of Hatch ( Tr. 119, 120) . Had these
things not been done there would have been a fire
and explosion in the tanker itself which sat right
adjacent to the conflagration as the photographs
disclose. There was only minor damage to the tires
and bumper of the tank wagon (Tr. 31, 80, 81).
The spark originated after the gasoline was completely unloaded.
4. 'The fumes which made the explosion and
fire possible did not come from the storage vent
stub or vent pipe but arose from this large quantity of escaping gasoline. This was the proximate
cause of the explosion and fire. The collation of the
statements of the experts hereinabove set forth,
demonstrates that the jury possessed competent evidence from which it could an'd di'd conclude that the
fatal vapor did not arise from the storage tank vent
stub or vent pipe as contended by appellants.
An 'analysis of the fa:ct situations in the "speculation and conjecture" cases cited by appellants
when compared to the instant case readily demonstrates the distinguishing facts at hand. I have
enumerated some of the evidentiary facts 'and permissible inferences in this case including the escape
of the large quantity of vapor producing gasoline
11
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and the inescapable inference that during the course
thereof the truck driver either was not present or
if present was not paying attention to the operations and the escaping fluid. To paraphrase the
statement from Sumsion vs. Streator-Smith, Inc.,
103 Utah 44, 132 P 2d 680, the evidence in this case
does "more than merely raise a conjecture or show
a probability". This Court stated in Olsen vs. Warwood, 123 Utah 111, 255 P 2d 725, 728, "that a
jury may find any fact which must reasonably and
of necessity flow from the other facts which are
in evidence."
Appellants' argument (Brief, 20), in light of
the evidentiary facts in this case, seems far-fetched
indeed:
"Other than the unfounded assumption
of the trial court and jury it could just as
well be assumed that the deceased driver was
at the place of the unloading operation and
had no knowledge of any escaping gasoline
or fumes" I I
We have carefully read the other cases cited
by appellants, namely, the poison bug case, Spackman vs. Benefit Assn. of Ry Employees, 97 Utah
91, 89 P 2d 490; the infra-red lamp case, Jackson
vs. Colstrom, 116 Utah 295, 209 P 2d 566; the naturopathic case, Forrest vs. Eason, 123 Utah 610,
261 P 2d 178; the Weber County child case, Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 116, 268 'P 2d 986;
12
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and the Pontiac mechanical defect case, Price vs.
Ashby'.s Inc., 354 P 2d 1064. We submit that the
principles enunciated in those cases support our
position.
By way of summary we repeat that respondents' proof as to the negligence of appellants rests,
not upon speculation, but upon evidentiary facts
and permissible deductions from such facts.
Having established the negligence of appellants
in connection with the presence of the large quantity
of flowing gasoline the law does not require that
we establish the precise manner by which it escaped
or by which it was ignited. In support of this position we submit to the court the following:
Defendants were professional handlers of gasoline and they knew that although gasoline itself
will not burn - the vapors arising therefrom when
mixed with air will burn and m:ay become extremely
dangerous. Justice Folland in V adner vs. Rozzelle,
45 P 2d 561, 563, stated that the defendant in that
case was "charged with knowledge that gasoline is
highly volatile and will give off fumes or gasses
that will ignite readily when in proximity to a fire
or a fl'ame."
The cases which I am about to cite stand for
the proposition that it is not incumbent upon plaintiff to show the exact source of the spark or energy
13
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which results in fire or explosion if plaintiff has
shown the negligence of defendant in connection
with presence of the gas or vapors. Most of these
cases are natural gas explosion cases but the principle underlying them is the same whether they involve fumes from gasoline or fumes from natural
gas. None of the following is a res ipsa case.

Luengene vs. Consumers Light, Heat & Pr;())el·
Company, 86 Kan. 866, 133 P 1032, 1034. Gas had
escaped and there was no evidence as to the source
of the spark which ignited the fumes:
"An instruction was asked to the effect
that, in the absence of such evidence, the action must fail. This was refused, and an instruction was given to the effect that such
evidence was not essential to a recovery, if
the proof was otherwise sufficient, and the
plaintiff himself was not negligent. This instruction and the refusal to give the one requested, are among the principal reasons
urged for reversal of the judgment."
The judgment was affirmed and the court continues at page 1034:
"In Gas Co. vs. Carter, 65 Kan. 565, 70
P. 635, it appeared that gas h·ad been allowed
to escape and accumulate in a cellar, and from
some unknown cause exploded. Such an explosion was a natural and probable consequence which might re'asonably have been forseen; and the company which negligently permitted the gas to escape was held liable for
the resulting damages. It was contended, as
14
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it is here, that a failure to prove how an accumulation of gas in a cellar became ignited
was fatal to a recovery of damages, caused
by its explosion. It was said [by the court]
'To this contention we do not agree' * * *".
Consumers Power Co. vs. Nash, 164 F (2d)
657, 658, 6 CCA 1947. This case arose in Michigan.
Gas h'ad escaped but the source of spark or energy
igniting the gas was not established. The court decided:
"If a generally injurious result should
have been forseen as reasonably probable, the
appellant was responsible for the injuries
which followed, even though it could not have
forseen the precise manner in which the explosive gasses might be vitalized. Re·asonable
apprehension of danger constitutes both the
criterion of liability and of the casual relation between negligence and injury if there
is no intervening efficient independent cause.''
In Gas Service Company vs. Payton, 180 F (2d)
505 ( 1950) which arose in Missouri the Court stated
that ordinarily a defendant is uder no obligation
to inspect the receiving facilities,
''But notwithstanding such ordinary rule
all of the authorities hold that a gas company
is to be held to the exercise of a high degree
of care which is commensurate with the deadly and dangerous character of its product, and
even though the defect is in appliances belonging to the consumer, if the gas company is
notified of the escaping gas its duty is to do
something about it, either to repair or cause
to be repaired the defect or to shut off the
15
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flow of gas until repairs are 1rtade." (Quoting from Barrickman vs. National Utilities
Co., 191 SW 2d 265, 268).
It is true as just stated that neither a gas
company nor a deliverer of gasoline is under duty
to inspect, maintain or repair the facilities of the
customer. The Minnesota Court in Bellefuil vs. Willmar Gas Co., Minn. 1954, 66 NW (2d) 779, 783,
after so observing speaks thus:

"If, however, a gas company acquires,
or ought reasonably to have acquired, knowledge of a dangerous condition, it is its duty
to shut off the gas until the customer has his
pipes, connections and appliances properly
repaired''.
Jeff vs. Cottonwood Falls Gas Company, Kan.
194 7, 178 p 2d 992, 996:
"If a dangerous condition was, or should
have been discovered, it then became defendant's duty to shut off the gas until the customer could have his own pipes, connections
and appliances properly repaired".
Even if the vapors negligently allowed to accumulate became ignited through "the effects of a
third person's innocent, tortious or criminal act"
the defendant is not protected from liability. Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2 p 1184, Sec.
43'9 and see filling station case of Robert R. Walker,
Inc. vs. Burgdorf, (Texas 1952), 244 SW (2df 506
where bystander deliberately threw a match into
16
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gasoline negligently allowed to accumulate on service station floor.
APPELLANTS POINT III STRUCTION NO. 6 (R. 43).

THE GIVING OF IN-

Appellants have quoted this instruction in-toto.
It is apparent from the facts reviewed and the
principles and authorities above cited there is no
error in this instruction. Both the fact situation
and the instruction given in Hooper vs. General
Motors Corporation, 123 Utah 515, 260 P 2d 549,
distinguished that case as appellants' quotation therefrom demonstrates (Brief, 25). The error in the
Hooper case stems from the erroneous instruction
that the separation of the automobile rim and spider
was "no evidence of the fact that they were defective". This negative instruction is radically different from the one given by Judge Keller.
It should not escape attention that instruction No. 3, which is referred to in this instruction
No. 6, covers the matter of alleged contributory
negligence of respondents - all in keeping with
appellants' pleadings and theory of the case, including the issue of whether the vapors escaped from
defective appliances of respondents and whether
ignition came from the motor.
In order to find against defendants under instruction No. 6 the jury was first required to find
non-negligence of the plaintiffs under instruction
17
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No. 3. This the jury did upon substantial evidence.
APPELLANTS' POINT IV - REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE.

I have carefully read the cases cited by 'appellants under this subdivision and feel that it would
be presum ptious on my part to presume to instruct
this Honorable Court about "presumptions". I somehow get the impression from reading Tuttle vs.
P.l.E., 121 Utah 420, 242 P. 2d 764, and Mecham
vs. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P 2d 285 that this Court
has devoted some hours to the consideration of
that subject.
These cases teach that the presumption of due
care is a procedural one and that no instruction
thereon should go to the jury if there is evidence
from which the jury could conclude th·at defendant
was negligent. The presumption has to do with
plaintiffs' burden of moving forward.
We were not sitting on dead-center at the conclusion of respondents' evidence in this case. Appellants' requested instruction on due care would have
been appropos if there had been ( 1) no evidence of
failure of truck driver Hatch to me·asure the gasoline already in the storage tank before he started
pumping the tank-load of gasoline into it, (2) no evidence of his leaving his tank wagon after the unloading operations began, ( 3) no evidence that the
18
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tank wagon was pumped dry and its valves and
hatches closed before the explosion occured, ( 4) no
evidence that as a result of the unloading operations gasoline of sufficient quantity escaped that
it flooded the area and distance described by the
witnesses,
and,

( 5) if all we had before us was an unexplained
explosion in the course of normal unloading operations with loss of life to the truck driver.
It is even more difficult for me to conceive the
relevancy of the presumption of "right conduct"
which attached to Mathesius in the fraud case of
Holland vs. Columbia Iron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d
303, 293 P 2d 700, (Appellants' Brief 21).
APPELLANTS' POINT V INSTRUCTION NO. 10.

REFUSAL TO GIVE

This point has been substantially argued under
Points I and II.
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CONCLUSION

The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
THERALD N. JENSEN
Attorney for Respondents
Price, Utah
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